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Abstract
Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others.
We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that
even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures non-trivial rents
from at most a single buyer: her payoffs converge to 0 as soon as a single buyer has
bought information. By contrast, if the seller can also sell valueless tokens, there
exists a “prepay equilibrium” where payment is extracted from all buyers before the
information good is released. By exploiting resale possibilities, this prepay equilibrium
gives the seller as high a payoff as she would achieve if resale were prohibited.
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1 Introduction
Overview: The market for information is central to today’s economy. But as has been
appreciated since Arrow (1962) (and likely before), information is a difficult commodity to
trade for at least two reasons. First, it is difficult to prove that one has valuable information
without revealing it, and second, information is easily replicated and re-sold once it has been
purchased. Our interest is in studying that second problem, namely how replication affects
the pricing of information. When a good is replicable, can a seller charge a high price for it?
We ask this question in a model of decentralized bargaining where a monopolist for infor-
mation may have significant bargaining power, can personalize prices, negotiates bilaterally
with buyers who face frictions in negotiations, and can coordinate behavior on her favorite
equilibrium of this game. We find that nevertheless, she appropriates very little of the social
surplus from selling information across all equilibria; a robust upper-bound for her payoff is
the value of information of a single buyer. This negative result suggests that without pro-
tection from resale, sellers of information have little incentive to acquire information even if
they have significant market power.
Why does the seller fail to appropriate much of the social surplus? The challenge is that
of commitment: neither a seller nor buyers can commit to not sell information to third-
parties in the future. Thus these players anticipate future competition. This commitment
problem endemic to a market for information is both dynamic and multilateral. Buyers are
unwilling to buy information at a high price today if they can buy it cheaply in the future.
The reason that they can do so is that those who have information cannot commit to not
compete with each other. If players were able to commit—either if the initial seller had
exclusive rights to sell information (e.g., as in a copyright with a permanent duration), or if
each party could commit to selling information only once—then the seller may appropriate a
substantial fraction of social surplus. The information good monopolist is stymied not only
by the buyers’ ability to resell information but also her own ability to do so.
We find a non-contractual solution to this commitment problem that exploits both resale
possibilities and bargaining delays. We allow the seller to create worthless tokens. We study
an equilibrium of that game—which we call a prepay equilibrium—where she holds up the
release of the information good until she has sold tokens to all but one buyer. Using these
tokens and delay, the seller achieves the same payoff that she would if resale were prohibited.
In this scheme, buyers are willing to pay substantial amounts for worthless tokens because
they anticipate being able to buy information in the future at very cheap prices. Effectively,
the seller exploits the commitment problem to encourage buyers to pay before they receive
information. Thus, within the commitment problem lies the seed to its solution.
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Framework and Results: We study decentralized Nash bargaining in a market where a
single seller is connected to multiple buyers. At time 0, that single seller has information,
which is valuable to each buyer. The information may correspond to knowing some payoff-
relevant state variable or the knowledge of how to use a technology or some transferable
skill or be some replicable content that the seller has produced (and cannot protect with a
copyright). The seller and each buyer face a trading opportunity at a random time. When
presented with a trading opportunity, the pair trade if their joint continuation value from
trading exceeds that from not trading. If trade occurs, the buyer consumes the information
and pays a price. But the challenge is that not only can the seller continue selling information
to others but now so can the buyer. Our model of a market involves a complete graph so in
selling information to that buyer, the seller now faces competition with respect to each other
buyer. Our results concern prices in the frequent-offer limit, as the time between trading
opportunities converges to 0.
Our first main result (Proposition 3 in Section 4.2) is that prices converge to 0, robustly
across all (Markovian) equilibria, as soon as two parties possess the information, i.e., once a
single buyer has purchased information. The intuition for this result is subtle because there
are two opposing forces. On the one hand, no seller wishes to lose the opportunity to sell
to a buyer, and so competition between sellers reduces the price of information. But on
the other hand, our decentralized framework features trading frictions in which each buyer
meets at most one seller at any instance, and bears some delay in waiting for the next trading
opportunity. Analogous to the Diamond Paradox (Diamond, 1971), one may anticipate that
these trading frictions would benefit sellers. In our setting, the competitive effect dwarfs the
“Diamond effect” so that prices converge to 0.
Given this future competition, how can a monopolist gain any surplus at all (without
the use of tokens)? Her ability to capture rents depends solely on how she conducts her first
trade when she is the only one who possesses information. We show that a seller-optimal
equilibrium necessarily uses delay as a strategy to capture some rents: the seller sets a high
price for her first sale of information and designates a particular buyer to be her exclusive
“first buyer.” After that first sale, prices converge to 0. Because a designated buyer knows
that he, in equilibrium, cannot obtain information from any other source, it is as if he and
the seller are negotiating bilaterally for that information, and thus, the price is bounded
away from 0. Given this possibility, we show that it is self-enforcing for the seller and every
other buyer to disagree until that first sale is made. While this strategy offers the seller some
surplus, the seller can do this only once. Thus, across equilibria, resale severely limits the
seller’s ability to capture rents.
Our solution to this dynamic and multilateral commitment problem combines the scheme
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identified above with tokens that have no intrinsic value. When there are nB buyers, the
seller trades both the information good itself and nB − 1 tokens. She first sells these nB − 1
tokens and then trades the information good exclusively to the buyer who could not buy a
token. We show that the seller can then appropriate approximately the same surplus from
each buyer as if information could not be resold.
Here is the strategic logic. Each buyer knows that he must either buy a token or be the
exclusive first information good buyer. In the latter case, he gives up substantial surplus
to the seller. Buying a token avoids this latter case, and lets him obtain information in
the future at a price of approximately 0. Thus, in equilibrium, the token becomes almost
as valuable as information itself. Because these tokens are scarce, the seller extracts the
value of the token from each buyer. The seller herself faces no incentive to deviate and sell
information early because it impedes her ability to extract surplus from future buyers.
This token scheme requires no commitment on the part of the seller and is self-enforcing.
One can view the token scheme as a non-Markovian equilibrium where tokens add just the
right amount of history-dependence to resolve the commitment problem. The resolution
isn’t through a punishment scheme (in the spirit of repeated games) but instead exploits (a)
bargaining dynamics when there are fewer tokens than buyers, and (b) information prices
converging to 0 once a single buyer has bought information. While we implement this solution
via tokens, it could be implemented just as well using public communication channels where
the seller and buyer announce who has prepaid for information.
Broader Connections: Our work is motivated by inefficiencies in social learning when
there is peer-to-peer sharing of knowledge and information; in other words, non-markets for
information. Knowledge and information diffusion are central to many household economic
decisions and technology adoption choices. But it is well-understood that information and
knowledge need not be acquired or diffuse efficiently (e.g. Galeotti and Goyal, 2010; Niehaus,
2011; Banerjee, Breza, Chandrasekhar, and Golub, 2018). A clear tension is that in these
non-markets for information, individuals do not internalize the gains that their knowledge
and information accrue to others. Moreover, who one knows can affect what one learns, and
so learning can be stymied by an incomplete network.
Motivated by this tension, one naturally wonders if the issue is that of a missing market
for information. If information and expertise could be bought and sold, or traded easily
for favors, would this facilitate investments in acquiring and sharing information?1 Our
negative result highlights a difficulty: once a knowledgeable farmer shares her know-how
1While one can view information in our model as the results of a Blackwell experiment, our preferred
interpretation is that it represents the knowledge (or know-how) of how to take a particular action, or
alternatively some conceptual content that can be easily replicated.
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with another, she is unable to extract further rents or favors from others on the basis of
that knowledge, especially since no one can commit to not reselling information. But our
positive result suggests that if there is a way to obtain favors in advance, then individuals
may have appropriate incentives to acquire information even without the use of contracts.
What might these tokens look like in practice? One way to view them is as the ability to
divide information into complementary bits, or splitting information into noisy relatively
uninformative bits. By dividing information into complementary bits, the seller can extract
prices or favors for each bit separately.
While our interest began with thinking about non-markets for information, there are
vast literatures that have explored related issues in the context of information markets and
intellectual property. We view our stylized model as clarifying some issues that emerge there.
One view, dating back to at least Schumpeter (1942) and also in Grossman and Helpman
(1994), is that imperfect competition and bargaining are necessary ingredients for people to
have incentives to acquire information. Our negative result shows that even if a seller is a
monopolist and has substantial bargaining power, she may not be able to capture much of
the social surplus that comes from acquiring information without restrictions to resale. But
our positive result shows that an information-good monopolist can capture much of these
rents through the use of both tokens and delay.
Information markets have been of broad interest recently; see Bergemann and Bonatti
(2019) for a survey. One vein of this literature on the problem of verifiability: how does a
seller prove that she has valuable information without giving it away? Anton and Yao (1994)
study a contracting solution where the information monopolist commits to sell information
to competing buyers if a buyer steals her idea without payment. Horner and Skrzypacz
(2014) offer an elegant dynamic solution that involves gradually selling information and
collecting payments. Our solutions also use delay but for the different reason that it helps
with commitment problems in a setting with resale possibilities.
This resale-commitment problem is the focus of the innovative (and, in our view, under-
appreciated) study of Polanski (2007). He studies information resale on arbitrary networks
in an environment without discounting and restricts attention to an immediate agreement
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, prices equal 0 along any cycle in the graph. Also study-
ing this environment, Manea (2020) provides a complete payoff characterization (for the
undiscounted limit) of the immediate agreement equilibrium in terms of the global network
structure for general networks. In his setting, buyers may be heterogeneous in their in-
trinsic value for information, and some buyers may not value information intrinsically at
all. His analysis uses “bottlenecks” and “redundant links” to offer an elegant perspective of
competition and intermediation in the networked market.
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We focus on a different set of issues, and importantly, we abstract from the complexity
of incomplete graphs that features in these papers. Instead of restricting attention to the
immediate agreement equilibrium in the undiscounted game, we derive bounds on prices
across all (Markov) equilibria in the frequent-offers limit of games with discounting.2 Looking
at other equilibria is important because the seller-optimal equilibrium features delay and not
immediate agreement. Our negative result shows that sellers’ inability to capture significant
rents (without tokens) emerges robustly across equilibria. Our positive result, where we
combine delays with a token-scheme to collect payments before the sale of information, has
not been studied in these papers.
Our stylized analysis omits a number of important features. One of these is direct
“consumption-externalities” for buyers, which has been studied extensively in the context
of financial markets (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1986, 1990). Muto (1986, 1990) studies how
these negative externalities from others holding information can deter buyers from reselling
information. Polanski (2019) extends results from his prior work to illustrate how they apply
with consumption externalities.
Our analysis uses approaches pioneered in studies of decentralized bargaining and match-
ing. Much of this literature concerns non-replicable goods. Condorelli, Galeotti, and Renou
(2016) and Manea (2018) study intermediation where buyers can choose to resell non-
replicable goods rather than consume them. In our setting, because resale prices converge to
0, buyers are not buying information for the sake of reselling it. Much of the strategic logic
of our paper exploits the fact that intertemporal competitive effects are strong when there
are small search frictions. Elliott and Talama`s (2019) show that intertemporal competition
resolves holdup problems in matching markets.
2 Examples
We illustrate the key ideas of our paper using a simple example. A single seller S (“she”) has
information that is valuable to two buyers, B1 and B2 (each of whom is a generic “he”). This
information has an “intrinsic value” of 1 to each buyer. All players have a discount rate of
r, and each link meets with probability ≈ λ dt in a period of length dt. When a pair meets,
tranfers are determined through symmetric Nash Bargaining where players’ outside options
are their continuation values without trade occurring, but following the same equilibrium.
The ratio λ/r measures the frequency of trading opportunities per unit of effective time, and
we think of λ/r →∞ as the frequent-offers limit of the game.
2One reason to study a frequent-offers limit of the game rather than the undiscounted game directly is
that it’s unclear that the equilibrium correspondence is continuous at the undiscounted limit.
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SB1 B2
(a) No Resale
S
B1 B2
(b) Resale
Figure 1: A Single Seller Trades Information with 2 Buyers.
2.1 No Resale: A Benchmark
First, consider the setting depicted in Figure 1a: each buyer can buy information from the
seller but cannot resell information to the other buyer. The setting is therefore of two
separate bilateral bargaining interactions and in each interaction, the Nash Bargaining price
p is that which divides the gains from trade equally between the buyer and seller. These
gains from trade are dynamic: the total gain from trade is the difference between the joint
surplus from trading today and waiting for the next opportunity to do so. Therefore, the
price solves
p−
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λtλ p dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller’s Gain from Trading Today
= (1− p)−
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λtλ (1− p) dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer’s Gain from Trading Today
. (1)
The solution, p = 1
2
, splits the surplus within each trading relationship, and thus, the seller
obtains half of the social surplus.
2.2 An Immediate Agreement Equilibrium with Resale
We now consider the setting shown in Figure 1b where all three players are connected and
can trade information. We first consider an immediate agreement equilibrium where parties
expect every trading opportunity to result in trade happening.
For our discussion below, it is useful to define γ ≡
∫∞
0
e−rte−2λtλ dt. For a player, fixing
one of his links ℓ, the term γ is the discounted weight that of his two links, ℓ is the next link
that is selected. In the frictionless limit, as λ→∞, γ approaches 1
2
.
We first consider the history after only one of the buyers is informed, and then consider
the original game in which no buyer is informed.
Only one buyer is informed : Suppose that buyer B1 is informed but buyer B2 is not; the
latter can then purchase information from one of two parties. Denote the equilibrium price
in this history by p(2) (because there are two players who can sell information). Splitting
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the gain in surplus from trade between the buyer and seller, p(2) solves
p(1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller’s Gain from Trading Today
= (1− p)(1− 2γ).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer’s Gain from Trading Today
(2)
The current seller’s gain from trading today is that she secures the sale; by contrast, if she
waits, she can only sell to the uninformed buyer if that buyer does not meet the other seller.
Therefore, for any strictly positive price p, the LHS is at least p/2. By contrast, the buyer’s
only gain from waiting is avoiding delay, which vanishes to 0 as we approach the frictionless
limit. For Eq. (2) to hold as λ
r
→∞, the price p(2) converges to 0.3
No buyer is informed : That p(2) is low influences negotiations at the earlier stage before any
buyer has purchased information. The payoff of buying information at price p for the first
buyer then is an immediate benefit of (1−p), and the potential for reselling that information
if he meets the other buyer first, which has a discounted value of γp(2). His “outside option”
is his payoff from waiting and not trading today: in the future, either the seller meets him
first in which case he is in the same position as today, or the seller meets the other buyer first,
in which case he can buy information at a price of p(2) from either of the other two players.
The first contingency obtains a stochastic discount of γ (reflecting that the seller does not
meet the other buyer first), and the second contingency obtains a stochastic discount of 2γ2
(reflecting that the other buyer buys information first, after which there are twice as many
opportunities to buy information). Thus, his gain from buying information is
1− p+ γp(2)− γ (1− p+ γp(2))− 2γ2(1− p(2))→ −
p
2
,
which implies that for trade to occur, the price that the first buyer pays for information
must converge to 0. The intuition is straightforward: because each buyer recognizes that he
can wait to be the second buyer and obtain the information for virtually free, he has no gain
from securing the information now at a strictly positive price.
The strategic logic is that neither the seller nor the first purchaser is able to commit to
not resell information. Once both are selling information, the price of information that the
second purchaser faces is close to 0. Because each buyer can wait to be that second buyer
(in this equilibrium), no buyer is willing to be the first to buy information unless that price
also converges to 0. Thus, the seller obtains 0 in the frequent-offers limit.
The issue here is that all parties expect every trading opportunity to end with trade.
Our next scheme shows how the seller can use a scheme with delay and disagreement so that
3The equilibrium price, p(2), equals p(2) = 1−2γ2−3γ , which converges to 0 as
λ
r → ∞. We note that this
outcome replicates Bertrand competition even though the buyer never meets both sellers simultaneously.
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she obtains 1/2 from the first buyer.
2.3 The Seller’s Optimal Equilibrium (without tokens)
Here, we construct an equilibrium where on the equilibrium path, only one specific buyer
can have the opportunity to be the second purchaser of information. Suppose that the seller
never trades information with buyer B2 until she has sold information to buyer B1; after
she sells information to B1, then she and B1 shall compete to sell information to B2 at the
price p(2) characterized above. Thus, buyer B1 never anticipates being able to be the second
purchaser of information. The price that the seller and B1 agree to solves
(p∗ + γp(2))
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λtλ dt
)
= (1− p∗ + γp(2))
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−λtλ dt
)
. (3)
The LHS reflects the seller’s gain from trading today versus waiting for tomorrow: she
obtains price p∗ today and after selling information, she can potentially be the first to sell
information to the other buyer (which is thus discounted by γ). The RHS is buyer B1’s gain
from trading today versus waiting. If he agrees, then he obtains a payoff of 1 − p∗ today
and potentially resells information successfully at p(2) (discounted by γ). If he rejects, he
anticipates that the next trading opportunity where there may be trade is where once again,
he faces the prospect of being the first to buy information from the seller. Solving Eq. (3)
yields that p∗ = 1
2
.
For this to be an equilibrium, it must be that the seller and B2 do not trade until the
seller has sold information to B1. No trading occurs only if their joint surplus from trading
is below their joint surplus from not trading:
λ
r + λ
(p∗ + γp(2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller’s Surplus with No Trade
+
λ
r + λ
(2γ(1− p(2)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer’s Surplus with No Trade
≥ 1 + 2γp(2).︸ ︷︷ ︸
Joint Surplus with Trade
As λ
r
→ ∞, the LHS converges to 3
2
whereas the RHS converges to 1. Therefore, the seller
and buyer B2 would not trade before the seller sells information to B1.
2.4 A Prepay Equilibrium: Combining Delay with Tokens
We illustrate how the seller can do better by using tokens that have no intrinsic value. The
seller creates a single token. Once the token has been sold (to either buyer), then we exploit
the equilibrium constructed in Section 2.3 where the other buyer has to be the first to buy
information. Thus, if buyer Bi buys the token, the seller sells information first only to
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the other buyer Bj . Once Bj purchases information, then the seller and Bj compete to sell
information to Bi, the buyer who had purchased the token.
4 Purchasing the token effectively
gives a buyer the ability to be the second purchaser of information.
In this equilibrium, once the first buyer has bought the token, the other buyer pays a
price of p∗ for information (as in Section 2.3). Now, consider the initial token trading stage.
Disagreement means that the seller may next meet with either buyer to trade the token.
The price p∗∗ for the token equalizes the gains from trade to the seller and buyer, and thus
solves
r
r + λ
(
p∗∗ +
λ
r + λ
p∗ + γp(2)
)
=
(1− γ)
(
−p∗∗ +
λ
r + λ
2γ[1− p(2)]
)
−γ
(
λ
r + λ
[1− p∗ + γp(2)]
) . (4)
The LHS is the seller’s gain from selling the token now versus waiting for the next trading
opportunity,5 and the RHS is the buyer’s gain.6 Because p∗ = 1/2 and p(2) → 0, we see
that the price of the token, p∗∗ converges to 1
2
in the frequent-offer limit. Thus, the seller
receives approximately 1/2 for selling the token to one buyer and 1/2 for selling information
to the other buyer. Notice that this payoff is identical to that when resale was prohib-
ited (Section 2.1). By selling the token, the seller is effectively receiving a prepayment for
information.
Why is the token so valuable? Buying the token gives a buyer the opportunity to buy
information as the second purchaser, at which point, the price for information is ≈ 0. By
contrast, if the other buyer buys the token, one has to purchase information at a price of
1/2. Thus, the equilibrium value of the token is ≈ 1/2. Because, by design, tokens are scarce
goods in that only one buyer can buy a token, the seller can extract close to 1/2 for that
token in the frequent-offers limit. Rather than being stymied by future resale possibilities,
this prepay equilibrium exploits them to secure rents for the seller.
4In an off-equilibrium path history where the seller sells information before the token, the seller and buyer
who has bought information compete in selling it to the other buyer.
5How this is derived: the seller first sells the token at price p∗∗, then after some delay sells information
to the other buyer at price p∗, and finally may get the opportunity to sell information to the remaining
uninformed buyer at price p(2). The seller’s disagreement payoff is the same as her agreement payoff,
subject to some delay.
6How this is derived: if the buyer agrees, he pays p∗∗, then waits until information is sold to the other
buyer, and finally pays p(2) for information from either of the other players. If he disagrees, there are two
possibilities. The first possibility is that the next trading event is the same and leads to the same payoff
as the agreement payoff; this explains the first term, in which the (1 − γ) discount reflects the gain from
agreement today versus waiting for this event in the future. The other possibility is that the seller sells the
token to the other buyer. In that case, this buyer anticipates paying p∗ for information in the future and
possibly selling it to the other buyer (the one who bought the token) at price p(2).
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3 Model
3.1 Environment
A set of buyers B ≡ {b1, . . . , bnB} interacts with a set of sellers S ≡ {s1, . . . , snS}, where
nB and nS are the total number of buyers and sellers respectively. We sometimes focus
attention on the special case of a single seller, i.e., nS = 1. The set of all agents is denoted
by A ≡ B ∪ S and n ≡ nB + nS ≥ 3 is the total number of agents. Each seller has identical
information that is of value v > 0 to each buyer.
Information is replicable so a seller can sell information separately to each buyer, and
each buyer who gains information can resell it to others. Accordingly, the set of buyers
and sellers changes over time, and so we distinguish between “informed” and “uninformed”
agents. Each pair of players has a “link”, which reflects the potential to trade information
for money if one party to that link is informed and the other is uninformed; we denote the
link between players i and j as ij.
Let T ≡ [0,∞) denote the interval of real-time. Trading opportunities occur on the
discrete-time grid T∆ ≡ {0,∆, 2∆, . . .}, where ∆ > 0 is the period length between trading
opportunities. At each time period t in T∆, a pair of agents i and j in A is selected uni-
formly at random to potentially trade information, independently of the past. Therefore,
the probability that a particular pair is selected is ρ ≡ 2
n(n−1)
. If the pair that is selected
is either two uninformed players or two informed players, then play proceeds to the next
period. Otherwise, the matched pair has an opportunity to trade information for a price.
In period t, the payoff-relevant state of the system is the set of informed agents at that
time. DefineM≡ {M ⊆ A : S ⊆M} as the payoff-relevant state space, where each element
M ∈ M corresponds to a feasible set of informed agents. Let m = |M | be the number of
informed agents when the set M is clear from the context. All players have discount rate
r ≥ 0 with a per-period discount factor of δ ≡ e−r∆. Our results concern the frictionless
limit of the market, namely as ∆→ 0.
3.2 Solution-Concept
Our solution-concept combines rational expectations in how players derive their continuation
values from future actions and Nash Bargaining, which specifies their actions given those
continuation values. Continuation values, trading prices, and trading decisions condition on
the set of informed players, which is the payoff-relevant state variable.
We define a value function V : A ×M → ℜ such that V (i,M) is player i’s expected
payoff when the set of informed players is M . It is measured from the start of a period,
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before a pair is selected for a trading opportunity. The set of feasible trades in a state M
depends on who can potentially sell information, and who still would like to buy information.
This space is denoted as T ≡ {(i, j,M) ∈ A2 ×M : i ∈M, j /∈M,M ∈ M}, where a trading
opportunity (i, j,M) denotes the possibility for i to sell information to j in stateM . Trading
functions comprise prices p : T → ℜ and decisions α : T → {0, 1} such that α(i, j,M) = 1
if player i sells information to player j in state M ; if trade occurs, it does so at price
p(i, j,M). Definition 1 uses trading functions to derive equilibrium continuation values while
Definition 2 uses these continuation values to derive trading functions consistent with Nash
Bargaining. Definition 3 brings these two together to define an equilibrium. We use R(m) ≡
m(m−1)+(n−m)(n−m−1)
2
to denote the number of redundant links—between two informed players
or two uninformed players—when the number of informed players is m.
Definition 1. Given trading functions (α, p), V satisfies Rational Expectations if for
every M ∈M, and every informed player i ∈M ,
V (i,M) ≡ρ
[∑
j /∈M
α(i, j,M)p(i, j,M)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sales
+
∑
i′∈M,j /∈M
(
α(i′, j,M)δV (i,M ∪ {j})
+(1− α(i′, j,M))δV (i,M)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Continuation Value
+ δR(m)V (i,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redundant Links
]
,
and for every uninformed player j /∈M ,
V (j,M) ≡ρ
[∑
i∈M
α(i, j,M)(v − p(i, j,M))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Purchases
+
∑
i∈M,j′ /∈M
(
α(i, j′,M)δV (j,M ∪ {j′})
+(1− α(i, j′,M))δV (j,M)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Continuation Value
+ δR(m)V (j,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redundant Links
]
.
The above expressions describe a player’s expected payoff from buying or selling infor-
mation (and the associated change in continuation values), and how her continuation value
evolves based on any other interaction that occurs in that time period.
Definition 2. Given the value function V , trading functions (α, p) satisfy Nash Bargain-
ing if for all (i, j,M) ∈ T , α(i, j,M) = 1 if and only if
δV (i,M ∪ {j}) + v + δV (j,M ∪ {j})︸ ︷︷ ︸
Joint Surplus with Trade
≥ δV (i,M) + δV (j,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Joint Surplus with No Trade
, (5)
and p(i, j,M) solves the following equation for p˜:
(1− w)

p˜ + δV (i,M ∪ {j})− δV (i,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Seller’s Surplus

 = w

v − p˜+ δV (j,M ∪ {j})− δV (j,M)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Change in Buyer’s Surplus

 .
(6)
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The first condition stipulates that information is traded between players i and j if and
only if their bilateral joint surplus from trade exceeds their joint surplus from not trading.
The second condition stipulates that should trade occur, it does so at a price that splits the
gains from trade according to the seller’s bargaining weight w. We assume that w ∈ [1
2
, 1);
this assumption highlights that our negative results emerge even though sellers of information
have substantial bargaining power.
Definition 3. An equilibrium is a triple (α, p, V ) such that given (α, p), the continuation
value function V satisfies Rational Expectations and given V , the trading functions (α, p)
satisfy Nash Bargaining.
Our solution-concept combines Nash Bargaining with dynamic considerations. All deci-
sions condition only on the set of informed players, which is the payoff-relevant state variable;
thus, the solution-concept has the flavor of a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole,
2001). This kind of solution-concept is standard, widely used both in the prior literature and
that on decentralized search and bargaining.7 As we elaborate in Section 5, one way to view
our prepay equilibrium is as a non-Markovian solution-concept where the payoff-irrelevant
tokens introduce a modicum of history-dependence.
4 The Challenge of Information Resales
Without the prospect for resale, if there were a single seller of information, she would obtain
wv from each buyer, accumulating a total of nBwv. In this section, we prove our negative
result that without the use of tokens, an upper bound to the seller’s payoff across equilibria
is wv. Section 4.1 proves some preliminary results on prices and existence of equilibria, and
Section 4.2 proves our main results.
4.1 Preliminary Results
We first fix a trading function α, and given that, we derive continuation values and prices
corresponding to Nash Bargaining. This trading function may be inconsistent with Nash
Bargaining in that we do not impose (5) of Definition 2.8 This intermediate step of deriving
Nash Bargaining prices and continuation values that emerge from any trading function is
useful for our subsequent results.
7While we do note pursue a non-cooperative microfoundation here, one may view each bilateral bargaining
game as the outcome of matched players playing “quick” random proposer bargaining games that breakdown
with some probability, as in Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986).
8Thus the trading function could be compelling pairs to trade (resp. not trade) even if their joint surplus
from trading is below (resp. above) that from not trading.
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Given a trading function α, we say that link ij is active when the set of informed players
is M if α(i, j,M) = 1. In other words, if i ∈ M and j /∈ M , then when players i and j have
a trading opportunity, they trade information so that their behavior induces a transition of
the set of informed players from M to M ∪ {j}.
Proposition 1. For any trading function α, the following hold:
1. There exist unique prices consistent with Rational Expectations and sellers receiving a
share of surplus equal to w.
2. If for every proper subset M ′ ⊂ A \M , there is more than one active link in state
M ∪M ′, then for all links ij that are active in state M , p(i, j,M)→ 0 as ∆→ 0.
3. If for some state M , there is only one active link ij, then
lim
∆→0
p(i, j,M) = wv + w lim
∆→0
V (j,M ∪ {j})− (1− w) lim
∆→0
V (i,M ∪ {j}).
Proposition 1 establishes that the trading function pins down, for every period length, the
prices and continuation values corresponding to Nash Bargaining. Furthermore, it specifies
an important consequence of competition: if there are multiple active links, then prices must
converge to 0 as the period length vanishes. Finally, if there is only a single active link,
then the players must be dividing their joint surplus from trading according to their Nash
bargaining weights.
We use Proposition 1 to prove that an equilibrium exists. Our approach is constructive.
We consider a trading function where every link is active: for every (i, j,M) ∈ T , α(i, j,M) =
1. In other words, this is an immediate agreement trading function. We prove that this
trading function generates prices and continuation values such that this immediate agreement
trading function is also consistent with Nash Bargaining.
Proposition 2. For every ∆ > 0, there exists an equilibrium.
Because every link is active in this equilibrium, Proposition 1 implies that prices converge
to 0 as ∆→ 0. Immediate agreement equilibria are the focus of prior work (Polanski, 2007;
Manea, 2020), which have shown that these equilibria exist in general environments where
all players are perfectly patient. Because our model involves frictions, our method of proof is
different. We use the simplicity of a complete graph to construct an equilibrium regardless
of the degree of frictions.
Our focus is not on the immediate agreement equilibrium per se, other than as a way to
claim equilibrium existence. Instead, our goal is to understand whether a seller’s inability
to capture a large fraction of the social surplus is a conclusion that holds robustly across
equilibria of this setting. We turn to this question next.
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4.2 Main Results: Bounding Prices Across All Equilibria
In Section 2.3, we see that a seller may use delay as a credible tool to obtain a non-trivial
share of the surplus (in contrast to the immediate agreement equilibrium) from one of the
buyers. We prove that this upper-bound is general: a monopolist can capture a non-trivial
fraction of the surplus from at most one buyer. We prove that this is an upper-bound by
first showing that once there are two or more informed players, prices converge to 0 across
all equilibria in the frequent-offers limit.
Proposition 3. If there are at least two informed agents, then equilibrium prices converge to
0 in the frictionless limit. Formally, for any equilibrium (α, p, V ) and M ∈ M, if |M | ≥ 2,
then for all s ∈ M, b ∈ A\M , lim∆→0 p(s, b,M) = 0 if α(s, b,M) = 1.
Proof. Given Proposition 1, it suffices to show that for any equilibrium, if |M | = m ≥ 2,
then there must be more than one active link. The proof proceeds by induction on the
number of uninformed players.
Base Case: Consider the base case where there is a single uninformed player, b, and
therefore, M = A\{b}. Suppose that buyer faces a trading opportunity with an informed
agent. Because, V (i, A) = 0 for every i ∈ A, it follows that the joint agreement surplus is v.
The highest possible joint disagreement surplus is δv < v. Therefore, in every equilibrium,
α(i, b, A\{b}) = 1 for every i ∈ A\{b}. Hence, there are at least two active links, and so
Proposition 1 implies that prices converge to 0.
Inductive Step: Now, suppose that whenever n− |M | ≤ k, there is more than one active
link. Consider the case where n − |M | = k + 1. Suppose towards a contradiction that
there is at most one active link. In equilibrium, it cannot be that there are zero active links
because this would imply disagreement payoffs of 0, in which case trading between any pair
of informed and uninformed players increases joint surplus. Now, suppose that there is one
active link sb in state M . It follows that
lim
∆→0
p(s, b,M) = wv + w lim
∆→0
V (s,M ∪ {b}) + (1− w) lim
∆→0
V (b,M ∪ {b}) = wv,
where the first equality follows from Part 3 of Proposition 1 and the second equality follows
from the inductive hypothesis. Because there are at least two informed agents in state M
(by assumption), there exists an informed agent s′ 6= s for whom α(s′, b,M) = 0. For this
to be consistent with Nash Bargaining,
δV (s′,M ∪ {b}) + v + δV (b,M ∪ {b}) < δV (s′,M) + δV (b,M).
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By the inductive hypothesis, the LHS converges to v as ∆→ 0. Therefore, taking the limit
of the above inequality, lim∆→0[V (s
′,M) + V (b,M)] ≥ v. Moreover, lim∆→0 V (s
′,M) =
lim∆→0 V (s
′,M ∪{b}) = 0, because s′ does not trade in stateM . Thus, lim∆→0 V (b,M) ≥ v.
However, lim∆→0 V (b,M) = v− lim∆→0 p(s, b,M) = (1−w)v < v, leading to a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 implies that once there are at least two sellers, competition forces prices
to converge to 0. This Bertrand-like outcome emerges even though all trading occurs in
bilateral meetings, with small frictions from delay and where pricing can be personalized.
When are prices strictly positive and bounded away from 0? A corollary of Proposition 3
is that this can happen only if (a) an information seller is a monopolist, and (b) she has not
yet sold information to any buyer. Thus, prices are strictly positive only on the first sale.
The result below constructs an equilibrium that attains this upper-bound: the single seller
of information, s, designates a single buyer as the first to whom she would sell information,
disagreeing with every other buyer before she does so. Such behavior garners her a limit
payoff of wv and as we show below, is consistent with Nash Bargaining. Her payoff here is
a 1/nB fraction of what she achieves were resale prohibited, and thus, when facing a large
group of buyers, resale possibilities severely limit her capability to appropriate a significant
fraction of social surplus. This result is a generalization of what we illustrate in Section 2.3.
Proposition 4. Suppose that there is a single seller of information, s. There exists ∆ > 0
such that for all ∆ < ∆, and for every buyer b, there exists an equilibrium where the seller
only sells information first to buyer b, disagreeing with all other buyers until she does so.
After she trades information with that buyer, the equilibrium features immediate agreement.
As ∆→ 0, the price charged to b converges to wv and all other prices converge to 0.
Proof. By Proposition 2, from any starting state, there exists an equilibrium with immediate
agreement. Therefore, all we need to construct is behavior in the initial state M0 = {s}. We
consider a trading function α such that for some buyer b, α(s, b,M0) = 1 and for all buyers
b′ 6= b, α(s, b′,M0) = 0. It follows that
lim
∆→0
p(s, b,M0) = wv + w lim
∆→0
V (b,M0 ∪ {b})− (1− w) lim
∆→0
V (s,M0 ∪ {b}) = wv,
where the first equality follows from Part 3 of Proposition 1, and the second follows from
Proposition 3. To prove that this is an equilibrium, we have to show that the the trading
function α specified above is consistent with Nash Bargaining.
Since sb is the only active link in M0, the joint disagreement surplus is less than the
joint agreement surplus because disagreement merely delays payoffs. Therefore, it follows
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that α(s, b,M0) = 1. Consider interactions between s and any buyer b′ 6= b. Disagreement
is consistent with equilibrium as long as the following inequality holds:
δV (s, {s, b′}) + v + δV (b′, {s, b′}) < δV (s, {s}) + δV (b′, {s}).
Proposition 3 implies that as ∆ → 0, V (s, {s, b′}) → 0 and V (b′, {s, b′}) → 0. Because of
the initial trading price, V (s, {s}) → wv. Finally, since b′ does not trade until after b has
become informed and thus pays nothing, V (b′, {s}) → v. Therefore, as ∆ → 0, the LHS
converges to v, and the RHS converges to (1 +w)v, so the inequality holds for sufficient low
values of ∆. Thus, this trading function is consistent with Nash Bargaining. Q.E.D.
5 The Prepay Equilibrium
Having shown that a monopolistic seller appropriates very little of the social surplus from
information, we turn to non-contractual avenues by which a monopolistic seller can do better.
We construct the “prepay equilibrium” where the seller collects prepayments by selling tokens
that have no intrinsic value. In this equilibrium, the seller obtains approximately nBwv in
the frictionless limit, which is her payoff if buyers were unable to resell information, and
thus, this prepay equilibrium solves the resale problem.
We begin by formally extending our model and solution-concept to allow for tokens. We
continue to use i and j to denote sellers and buyers, respectively. We introduce k as an
index for the type of item being sold where k = 1 denotes a token and k = 2 denotes the
information good itself. A generic state is now (M,K) where M still refers to the set of
agents with the information good and K refers to the set of buyers who have bought a token
from the seller. The function α(i, j, k,M,K) is an indicator of whether i sells an item of
type k to j in state (M,K). Price p(i, j, k,M,K) is the price paid in the same transaction
(if it occurs). Each player i has value function V (i,M,K).
The model of trading opportunities is the same as before, with equal probabilities of each
pair trading in each period. However, a trading pair now simultaneously considers both token
trades and information good trades. Nash Bargaining is defined slightly differently but in
the standard way. If any trade occurs, α(i, j, 1,M,K) and α(i, j, 2,M,K) will maximize the
joint surplus from trade, and the joint surplus from that trade is at least as great as the joint
surplus with no trade. There could be multiplicity due to multiple types of trades giving the
maximum joint surplus from trade, but since we are only constructing an equilibrium here,
this does not matter. The definition of Rational Expectations undergoes a straightforward
modification to account for the different types of trades possible. Rational Expectations and
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Nash Bargaining are combined as before to define equilibrium.
Let us describe the trading decisions of this prepay equilibrium. For any state (M,K)
with M = {s} and |K| < nB − 1,
α(i, j, k,M,K) =

1 if i = s, j ∈ B\K, k = 1,0 otherwise.
That is, trades occur only between the initial seller and buyers who have not yet bought
tokens, and trades involve only tokens. Once nB − 1 tokens have been sold, the market for
tokens shuts down: α(i, j, 1,M,K) = 0 for all i, j and K such that |K| = nB − 1. At that
stage, the information good is initially sold exclusively to the only buyer who does not have
a token: for any K such that |K| = nB − 1,
α(i, j, k, {s}, K) =

1 if i = s, j ∈ B\K, k = 2,0 otherwise.
If the seller faces a buyer to whom she has sold a token, that trading opportunity ends
in disagreement. After the sale of information to the buyer j that did not buy a token—
and more generally for any state where information is possessed by at least two players—we
transition to the immediate agreement equilibrium where every trading opportunity between
an informed and an uninformed player results in trade: if M 6= {s},
α(i, j, k,M,K) =

1 if i ∈M, j /∈M, k = 2,0 otherwise.
This fully describes the trading decisions. The following result proves existence of this
prepay equilibrium, its consistency with Nash Bargaining, and derives the seller’s payoff in
the frequent-offer limit.
Proposition 5. Suppose that there is a single seller of information, s. There exists ∆ > 0
such that for all ∆ < ∆, the prepay equilibrium exists. Moreover, as ∆→ 0, the prices paid
for the tokens and the first sale of the information good in the prepay equilibrium all converge
to wv, while all other prices converge to 0.
The formal proof of Proposition 5 can be found in the Appendix, but the strategic logic
combines that of Nash Bargaining for a scarce good (tokens) with that of Proposition 4.
Let us trace this backwards, once all the tokens are sold. The remaining buyer is willing
to pay the bilateral bargaining price for information (≈ wv) for the reasons described in
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Proposition 4 (since the game is, at this stage, identical to that of Section 4.2). After this
buyer buys information, then competition in the resale market ensures that the price of
information incurred by all other buyers—those who bought tokens—converges to 0 (as
outlined in Propositions 3 and 4).
We see that buying a token allows a buyer to buy information in the (near-)future at
a price of ≈ 0, generating a price discount of approximately wv relative to the buyer who
doesn’t buy a token. In equilibrium, a token’s value is then approximately wv. We now
argue that the scarcity of tokens guarantees that the price of tokens must converge to wv.
There are nB − 1 tokens but there are nB buyers. So before all the tokens are sold, when
the seller meets a buyer who has not yet bought a token, the buyer has to worry about
competition for tokens. On his end, the gain from buying now is that he can guarantee
himself a token; if he delays, there is a chance that the next time he meets the seller, all the
tokens are sold and he has to pay wv for information. By contrast, for the seller, the only
gain from selling this token now versus waiting is the cost of delay, which is vanishing in the
frequent-offer limit. For these gains to remain magnitudes of the same proportional size, it
must be that in the frequent-offer limit, the buyer’s gain from buying a token is vanishing,
and hence, the price of a token must approximate wv.
Above, we have outlined the on-path equilibrium logic for how the seller extracts wv
from each buyer. She must also have incentives to not sell information too early (before she
has sold all of the tokens) and to not sell information initially to a buyer who has already
bought a token. As we show in the proof, neither issue arises.9
One way to view this result, and its contrast with Propositions 3 and 4 is that our prior
negative results pertained to “Markov Perfect Equilibria” where neither the seller nor buyers
could condition on payoff-irrelevant state variables. In introducing tokens, we have added
a degree of history-dependence where both the seller’s and the buyers’ behaviors condition
on a payoff-irrelevant variable, namely K. We view the degree of history-dependence that
has been added to be somewhat minimal and the strategic logic does not use reward and
punishment schemes that typically feature in models of repeated games. Instead, the tokens
leverage the market competition already inherent in bargaining when there is a short side
of the market. Thus, one way to see this result is that this mild form of history-dependence
allows the seller to not merely sidestep the resale issue but to instead exploit it.
9The logic in each case is straightforward. Selling the information good early (before nB − 1 tokens have
been sold) is inconsistent with Nash bargaining, because the market for tokens would shut down, eliminating
a source of extra surplus for the monopolist seller. Moreover, selling the information good initially to a
buyer who has already bought a token is inconsistent with Nash bargaining, because that buyer would not
be willing to pay anything in the frictionless limit, as they could simply wait until the buyer who does not
have (or will not have) a token trades for the information good.
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6 Discussion
Summary: In this paper, we investigated how the possibility for resale influences the
pricing of information. Robustly across equilibria, prices converge to 0 as soon as two players
possess information. Accordingly, if a monopolistic seller is constrained to the option of
selling or not selling information, the best she can do is obtain the share of one buyer’s value of
information. Once she has sold information to a buyer, then the subsequent competition from
resale impedes her from charging high prices. Our results suggest that even market power,
decentralized bargaining, search frictions, personalized prices, and equilibrium selection do
not overcome the commitment problem that comes from resale possibilities.
Inherent in this commitment problem is an antidote to it. We show that if the seller can
trade both information and worthless tokens, she can use a prepay scheme to obtain a payoff
approximately equal to that of perfect intellectual property protections. In this equilibrium,
the seller sells nB − 1 tokens (where nB is the number of buyers). The buyer who is unable
to buy a token pays the standard bilateral bargaining price for information. Buyers who buy
tokens are able to buy information at a discount because buying a token ensures that one
can buy information after someone else already has; in other words, a token buyer exploits
the competitive effect of resale. In equilibrium, the value of a token to a buyer is the price
discount that it generates, which converges to the bilateral bargaining price of information.
Because tokens are scarce, the equilibrium price of a token converges to its value. Thus, the
seller obtains the bilateral bargaining price of information from each buyer.
Interpretations and Caveats: While we have described our prepay equilibrium as in-
volving the sale of tokens, one potential way to implement it is for the seller to divide
information into complementary bits (which are uninformative on their own) where each bit
is sold to a different buyer. From this perspective, our model offers a perspective on why an
information seller may benefit from releasing noisy information over time when she worries
about that information being resold.
Our work necessarily connects to the rich debate on intellectual property protections,
whether they are necessary, and how copyrights and patents might stimulate or impede in-
novation. While our negative result suggests a basic tension that information sellers face
without protection from resale, our positive result offers a non-contractual solution. This
solution does require an ability to secure prepayment from all parties prior to selling in-
formation. Thus, in contrast to permanent intellectual property protection, the seller can
extract surplus from the set of buyers present at a time but may be unable to do so from new
buyers that enter the market. That said, this may be efficient in that it generates sufficient
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incentives for the initial seller to acquire information, and the low price that future buyers
face encourages their entry.
We have used a stylized model to make transparent the strategic forces inherent in in-
formation resale. We assume that players are identical in their value for information and
pairwise bargaining weights. These assumptions are made for analytical tractability. The
difficulty with heterogeneity is in extending our existence result (Proposition 1) because we
can no longer construct an equilibrium directly. But if an equilibrium exists, the building
block of both our negative and positive result—Proposition 3—still applies. Thus, without
tokens, a monopolistic seller cannot charge much for information after selling it to one player.
But with tokens, the monopolistic seller can exploit low information prices in the future to
charge more for tokens upfront.
Our setting is one where information is non-rival in consumption but where buyers are
excludable. In a number of settings, one may envision payoff externalities in the consumption
of information. In financial markets, information may be more valuable the less of it that
others have. In technology adoption decisions, there may be direct complementarities in
others using the same technology or having the same knowhow. We abstract from these
externalities. We anticipate that the strategic forces that we study remain in richer settings,
although the strength of these forces will be moderated or amplified by these externalities.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 on page 13. For a trading decision function α, let
B(i,M) ≡ {j ∈ A \M : α(i, j,M) = 1},
S(j,M) ≡ {i ∈M : α(i, j,M) = 1}.
When the set of informed players is M , B(i,M) is the set of buyers who trade with seller
i, and S(j,M) is the set of sellers who trade with buyer j. Let L(M) ≡ {ij|α(i, j,M) = 1}
denote the set of active links and Lc(M) denote its complement. Finally, let ρˆ(δ,M) ≡
ρ
1−δρ|Lc(M)|
, where recall that ρ ≡ 2
n(n−1)
is the probability that a specific link is recognized.
To economize on notation, we suppress the arguments of ρˆ but note that in the frequent
offer limit, ρˆ(δ,M)→ 1
|L(M)|
.
Our proof follows by induction.
Base Case: Suppose that |A \M | = 1, with the remaining uninformed buyer being player j.
For any i ∈ S(j,M), Nash Bargaining implies that
(1− w)
w
× p(i, j,M) (1− δρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Seller i′s gain from trade
= v − p(i, j,M)− δρˆ

|L(M)|v − ∑
i′∈S(j,M)
p(i′, j,M)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Buyer j’s gain from trade
,
where recall that w is the seller’s bargaining weight. This equation can be re-written as
p(i, j,M)−
wδρˆ
1− δρˆ
∑
i′∈S(j,M)\{i}
p(i′, j,M) =
w(1− δρˆ|L(M)|)
1− δρˆ
v.
An analogous equation holds for any other i′ such that i′ ∈ S(j,M), and subtracting that
equation from the one above implies that p(i, j,M) = p(i′, j,M), so prices are symmetric.
Therefore, for every ij ∈ L(M),
p(i, j,M) =
w(1− δρˆ|L(M)|)
1− δρˆ(w|L(M)|+ (1− w))
v,
which proves that a unique solution exists. Note that if |L(M)| = 1, then p(i, j,M) = w. If
L(M) > 1, then lim∆→0 p(i, j,M) = 0.
10
Inductive Step: Suppose that for every M ′ with |M ′| ≥ x, prices p(i, j,M ′) are uniquely
10As ∆→ 0, δρˆ|L(M)| → 1, which implies that the numerator converges to 0. The denominator converges
to (1 − w)(1 − (|L(M)|)−1), which is strictly positive for |L(M)| ≥ 2.
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determined for every ij ∈ L(M ′), and if |L(M ′)| ≥ 2 these prices all converge to 0 as ∆→ 0.
Prices being uniquely determined implies that for each player k, V (k,M ′) is also unique (by
Rational Expectations and the inductive hypothesis). We first argue that prices in M with
|M | = x− 1 must also be unique.
For any ij ∈ L(M), Recursive Nash Bargaining implies that
(1− w) [p(i, j,M) + δV (i,M ∪ {j})− δV (i,M)]
= w [v − p(i, j,M) + δV (j,M ∪ {j})− δV (j,M)] . (7)
Using Rational Expectations to expand the value functions in (7), we obtain
(1− w)

p(i, j,M) + δV (i,M ∪ {j})− δρˆ

 ∑
j′∈B(i,M)
p(i, j′,M) + δ
∑
i′j′∈L(M)
V (i,M ∪ {j′})




= w
[
v − p(i, j,M) + δV (j,M ∪ {j})− δρˆ

 ∑
i′∈S(j,M)
[v − p(i′, j,M)] + δ
∑
i′j′∈L(M)
V (j,M ∪ {j′})

].
We collect all terms that involve prices in stateM on the LHS and others on the RHS. Define
κ(i, j,M) ≡ w(1− δρˆ|S(j,M)|)v + wδ

V (j,M ∪ {j})− ρˆδ ∑
i′j′∈L(M)
V (j,M ∪ {j′})


− (1− w)δ

V (i,M ∪ {j})− ρˆδ ∑
i′j′∈L(M)
V (i,M ∪ {j′})

 .
Then it follows that
κ(i, j,M) =[1− δρˆ]p(i, j,M)− (1− w)δρˆ
∑
j′∈B(i,M)\{j}
p(i, j′,M)− wδρˆ
∑
i′∈S(j,M)\{i}
p(i′, j,M).
Note that κ(i, j,M) is uniquely determined in equilibrium since it depends only on parame-
ters and future continuation values, which are uniquely determined. Similar equations hold
for every active link between a buyer and a seller in state M .
We index these links as 1, . . . , |L(M)| (the specific indexing is unimportant) and define
a |L(M)| × |L(M)| matrix Φ(M) where Φuv(M) = w if link u and link v are distinct active
links and share a common buyer, Φuv(M) = 1−w if link u and link v are distinct active links
and share a common seller, and Φuv(M) = 0 otherwise. Combining the |L(M)| equations
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yields the following matrix equation:[
I|L(M)| −
δρˆ
1− δρˆ
Φ(M)
]
~p(M) =
1
1− δρˆ
~κ(M) (8)
Here, ~p(M) and ~κ(M) are |L(M)| × 1 vectors consisting of all of the state M prices and
values of κ. Since the right hand side of this last equation is unique, the current state price
vector ~p(M) is unique if matrix Ψ(M) ≡
[
I|L(M)| −
δρˆ
1−δρˆ
Φ(M)
]
is invertible.
Note that Ψ(M) is a Z-matrix because the off-diagonal elements are all negative. Addi-
tionally, we can show that Ψ(M) exhibits semipositivity; that is, there exists a vector ~x > 0
such that Ψ(M)~x > 0.11 Being a Z-matrix that exhibits semipositivity is equivalent to Ψ(M)
being a non-singular M-matrix and thus invertible (Plemmons, 1977). This completes the
proof of existence and uniqueness of the price vector.
To show that prices converge to 0 whenever more than one link is active in the current
and all subsequent states (the M ∪M ′ in the statement of the lemma), consider the values of
κ(i, j,M). From the inductive hypothesis, every informed agent’s continuation payoff on a
subsequent state converges to 0 (they capture nothing from resale). Moreover, every buyer’s
continuation payoff on a subsequent state converges to v (they pay nothing to buy, but they
capture nothing from resale). Also, note that ρˆ→ 1
|L(M)|
. This implies that
κ(i, j,M)→ w
(
1−
|S(j,M)|
|L(M)|
)
v − w

 1
|L(M)|
∑
i′j′∈L(M),j′ 6=j
v

 = 0
Since the solution price vector is unique, and the right hand side of the price equation → 0
(when |L(M)| > 1), the solution price vector must also → 0.
When |L(M)| = 1, the right hand side of Equation (8) takes on an indeterminate form
in the limit. In this case, I|L(M)| = 1. By the definition of matrix Φ(M), the only non-zero
entries correspond to pairs of distinct active links, of which there are none, so Φ(M) = 0.
Substituting in the expression for κ(i, j,M) and taking the limit ∆→ 0,
lim
∆→0
p(i, j,M) = lim
∆→0
κ(i, j,M)
1− δρˆ
= wv + w lim
∆→0
V (j,M ∪ {j})− (1− w) lim
∆→0
V (i,M ∪ {j})
11This is shown by using for ~x a vector of all ones and noting that for all u,
[Ψ(M)~x]u = 1− [(1 − w)|B(i,M)|+ w|S(j,M)| − 1]
δρˆ
1− δρˆ
> 1− (|L(M)| − 1)
ρ
1−ρ|Lc(M)|
1− ρ1−ρ|Lc(M)|
= 1−
ρ(|L(M)| − 1)
1− ρ[|Lc(M)|+ 1]
= 0.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 on page 13. We define “immediate agreement” as α(i, j,M) = 1 for
all (i, j,M) ∈ T . We first prove that for every ∆, immediate agreement prices are symmetric:
∀M and ∀i, i′ ∈ M, ∀j, j′ ∈ A \M, p(i, j,M) = p(i′, j′,M) ≡ p(m). We establish this claim
by induction. The base case (m = n− 1) symmetry was already proven for Proposition 1.
Inductive Step: Suppose that for every M ′ with |M ′| ≥ x, prices p(i, j,M ′) are symmetric.
Since all seller/buyer links are active, we write the price equation by indexing links as
1, . . . , [m(n−m)]. Φ(M) and Ψ(M) are defined in the same way, so the price equation is
Ψ(M)~p(M) =
1
1− δρ(δ,m)
~κ(M),
where ρ(δ,m) ≡ ρ
1−δρR(m)
.
To see that prices are symmetric, first notice that price symmetry in the inductive hy-
pothesis implies that all future buyer continuation payoffs are the same and all future seller
continuation payoffs are the same, and these depend only on the number of sellers. Therefore,
κ(i, j,M) does not depend on the identities of the particular buyer or seller or the precise
configuration, so ~κ(M) can be written as ~κ(M) = κ(m)~1, where κ(m) is some scalar, and ~1 is
the vector of all ones. Note that if prices are symmetric, there exists a scalar p(M) such that
~p(M) = p(M)~1. Then, Ψ(M)~p(M) = p(M)Ψ(M)~1. Because of the symmetry of the network
(in each state, every buyer is linked to the same number of sellers, and every seller is linked
to the same number of buyers), every row of Ψ(M) has the same sum. Moreover, this row
sum depends only on the number of sellers. Therefore, Ψ(M)~1 = s(m)~1, where s(m) is the
(scalar) row sum. Now, the price equation can be written as p(M)s(m)~1 = 1
1−δρ(m)
κ(m)~1.
For any given κ(m), there must exist a p(M) satisfying this equation. Moreover, it must
depend only on m. Because the pricing equation determines unique prices, p(M) is this
unique, symmetric price. In other words, for all M and for all i, i′ ∈M and all j, j′ ∈ A\M ,
p(i, j,M) = p(i′, j′,M), and this price may be written as p(m).
We use this symmetry result to write state M prices as p(m), buyer continuation payoffs
as V b(m), and seller continuation payoffs as V s(m).
V s(m) = ρ(δ,m) [(n−m)p(m) + δm(n−m)V s(m+ 1)] ,
V b(m) = ρ(δ,m)
[
m[v − p(m)] + δm(n−m− 1)V b(m+ 1) + δmV s(m+ 1)
]
,
p(m) = w(v + δV s(m+ 1)− δV b(m))− (1− w)(δV s(m+ 1)− δV s(m)).
We use the following lemma, which we prove at the end of the Appendix.
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Lemma 1. Suppose that trading decisions are immediate agreement, i.e., [α(i, j,M) =
1, ∀i, j,M ]. Then for every m, the Nash Bargaining prices, p(m) are non-negative.
Using Lemma 1, to show that an immediate agreement equilibrium exists it suffices to
show that the joint surplus from agreement exceeds the joint surplus from disagreement, for
all m (where m is the number of informed players):
v + 2δV s(m+ 1)− δ[V s(m) + V b(m)] ≥ 0
We start with the difference between the seller’s immediate and delayed next step continu-
ation payoffs. Then, we use the rational expectations equation to step the value functions
forward:
V s(m)− δV s(m+ 1) = ρ(δ,m)[(n−m)p(m) +m(n−m)δV s(m+ 1)]− δV s(m+ 1)
= ρ(δ,m)(n−m)p(m)− [1−m(n−m)ρ(δ,m)]δV s(m+ 1)
≤ ρ(δ,m)(n−m)p(m)
Since V s(m) ≥ 0, p(m) ≥ 0, δ < 1, and ρ(δ,m)(n−m) < 1, we can reduce the left hand side
and increase the right hand side of this inequality to yield
δ[V s(m)− V s(m+ 1)] ≤ p(m)
Using the formula for Nash Bargaining prices,
⇔δ[V s(m)− V s(m+ 1)] ≤ w(v + δV s(m+ 1)− δV b(m))− (1− w)(δV s(m+ 1)− δV s(m))
⇔δ[V s(m)− V s(m+ 1)] ≤ wv + wδ[V s(m+ 1)− V b(m)] + (1− w)δ(V s(m)− V s(m+ 1))
⇔wδ[V s(m)− V s(m+ 1)] ≤ wv + wδ[V s(m+ 1)− V b(m)]
⇔δ[V s(m)− V s(m+ 1)] ≤ v + δ[V s(m+ 1)− V b(m)]
⇔v + 2δV s(m+ 1)− δ[V b(m) + V s(m)] ≥ 0
Note that the bounding argument above used the non-negative prices result in Lemma 1 and
the fact that all seller continuation payoffs are non-negative, which is a direct consequence
of non-negative prices. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 on page 17. In any state where M = {s} and |K| = nB − 1, it is
clear that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for low ∆ by Proposition 4. Moreover, the
equilibrium conditions are satisfied in all off the equilibrium path states, as the immediate
agreement equilibrium always exists (Proposition 2). In both of these cases, note that tokens
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could hypothetically continue to be traded, but afterwards there is immediate agreement
regardless, so there are no gains from token trade and α(i, j, 1,M,K) = 0 is consistent with
Nash Bargaining. We proceed by induction on |K|.
As the base case, suppose M = {s} and |K| = nB − 1, so that all tokens have been
sold but the information good has not. This is analogous to the setting of Proposition 4, so
everything is consistent with equilibrium and the price converges to wv. Futhermore, the
prices and continuation payoffs are trivially symmetric. That is, they depend only on the
number of tokens sold thus far and in the case of a buyer’s continuation payoff, whether or
not the buyer has already bought a token.
For the inductive step, suppose that for all (M,K) with M = {s} and |K| = x + 1 for
some x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , nB − 2}, the equilibrium conditions are met (for low ∆), limit prices are
as in the statement of the Proposition, and prices and continuation payoffs are symmetric
as previously described. We now consider states where M = {s} and |K| = x.
First, consider trade of tokens to buyers j ∈ K. If the trade were to take place, the state
would not change, and thus the joint surplus from trade and the joint surplus with no trade
are equal. Thus, the equilibrium conditions are satisfied by α(i, j, 1,M,K) = 0.12 The same
argument also justifies no trade in the second-hand market for tokens, i.e., from seller i ∈ K
to buyer j ∈ B \K. Since initial seller s does not record this buyer as having bought from
them, the state does not advance, so there are no joint gains from trade.
Next, we consider trade of tokens from initial seller s to buyers j ∈ B \K. We use ρˆ as
in the proof of Proposition 1, noting that the active links are those between s and buyers
j ∈ B \K. The price is
p(s, j, 1,M,K) = wδ [V (j,M,K ∪ {j})− V (j,M,K)]− (1− w)δ [V (s,M,K ∪ {j})− V (s,M,K)] ,
which can be re-written as
p(s, j, 1,M,K) =wδ

V (j,M,K ∪ {j})− ρˆ

−p(s, j, 1,M,K) + ∑
j′∈B\K
δV (j,M,K ∪ {j′})




− (1− w)δ

V (s,M,K ∪ {j})− ρˆ ∑
j′∈B\K
[p(s, j′, 1,M,K) + δV (s,M,K ∪ {j′})]

 .
12If this seems to be an artifact of our particular definition of the state space, note that the only value
created by trading tokens is in allowing the state to advance to where the information good is distributed.
Since trading a token to someone who already has one does not affect the progression of states in the future
(in this particular equilibrium), there is no net joint surplus from the trade.
27
Re-arranging terms yields
(1− δρˆ)p(s, j, 1,M,K)− δρˆ(1− w)
∑
j′∈B\(K∪{j})
p(s, j′, 1,M,K)
= w
[
(1− δρˆ)δV (j,M,K ∪ {j})− δρˆ
∑
j′∈B\(K∪{j})
δV (j,M,K ∪ {j′})
]
− (1− w)
[
(1− δρˆ)δV (s,M,K ∪ {j})− δρˆ
∑
j′∈B\(K∪{j})
δV (s,M,K ∪ {j′})
]
(9)
We can write this more compactly as
Ψ(M,K)~p(M,K) =
1
1− δρˆ
~κ(M,K)
where Ψ(M,K) is the [nB−|K|]×[nB−|K|] matrix with 1 along the diagonal and−
δρˆ
1−δρˆ
(1−w)
everywhere else, ~p(M,K) is the [nB − |K|]-vector of prices of tokens being traded in the
current state, and ~κ(M,K) is the [nB − |K|]-vector of entries as in the right hand side
of Equation (9). Ψ(M) is a non-singular M-matrix (see the proof of Proposition 1 for an
analogous proof). By the inductive hypothesis, this implies that the Nash bargaining prices
in the current state exist and are unique. Also by the inductive hypothesis, 1
1−δρˆ
~κ(M,K)→
wv − (1− w)wv. This implies that as ∆→ 0, p(s, j, 1,M,K)→ wv for all j ∈ B \K.
Also, note that each element of ~κ(M,K) is the same by the symmetry part of the inductive
hypothesis, and since the matrix Ψ(M,K) has a constant row sum that depends only on
|K|, the prices only depend on |K|. We will write these prices as p(|K|). Moreover, since all
current continuation payoffs depend only on p(|K|) and future continuation payoffs (which
by the inductive hypothesis only depend on |K|), the current continuation payoffs depend
only on |K|, whether the agent is the seller s, and whether the agent is a buyer who already
bought a token or not. Continuation payoffs will be denoted V s(|K|) for the seller, V b+(|K|)
for a buyer who already possesses a token, and V b−(|K|) for a buyer who does not yet possess
a token. Note that the discussion of this paragraph has been all conditional onM = {s}, and
thus M is suppressed in the notation; different sets M give different continuation payoffs.
We now consider the continuation payoffs at the token bargaining stage and that trading
occurs only if the joint surplus from agreement is weakly more from that of disagreement:
V s(|K|)− δV s(|K|+ 1) =ρˆ(nB − |K|)[p(|K|) + δV
s(|K|+ 1)]− δV s(|K|+ 1)
=ρˆ(nB − |K|)p(|K|)− [1− ρˆ(nB − |K|)]δV
s(|K|+ 1)
≤ρˆ(nB − |K|)p(|K|)
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which implies that δ[V s(|K|) − V s(|K| + 1)] ≤ p(|K|). This is equivalent to δ[V s(|K|) −
V s(|K|+1)] ≤ w(δV b+(|K|+1)− δV b−(|K|))− (1−w)(δV s(|K|+1)− δV s(|K|)), which is
equivalent to wδ[V s(|K|)− V s(|K|+ 1)] +wδ[V b−(|K|)− V b+(|K|+ 1)] ≤ 0, and therefore,
δ[V b+(|K|+ 1) + V s(|K|+ 1)] ≥ δ[V b−(|K|) + V s(|K|)].13
Finally, consider potential trade of the information good in this same inductive step (that
is, when |K| < nB − 1). For any buyer j, we will show that the following inequality holds in
the limit:
v + δV (s,M ∪ {j}, K) + δV (b,M ∪ {j}, K) ≤ δV (s,M,K) + δV (j,M,K)
Since selling the information good to j triggers immediate agreement in the future, both
V (j,M∪{j}, K) and V (s,M∪{j}, K)→ 0. Since the seller has at least one token remaining
to sell, lim∆→0 V (s,M,K) > wv. At worst, the buyer will still have to pay in order to get
the information good, so lim∆→0 V (j,M,K) ≥ (1 − w)v. Therefore, for sufficiently low ∆,
the inequality holds.
Combining these two inequalities (one for tokens in isolation, and one for the information
good in isolation), it is clear for this pair that trading only the token is at least as good as
trading nothing, which is at least as good as trading only the information good. Finally,
note that conditional on trading the information good (which triggers immediate agreement
and no future token trade), trading the token as well changes nothing about the future
continuation payoffs, so the joint surplus from trading both is tied for lowest. Thus, trading
the token but not the information good is consistent with equilibrium (for low enough ∆).
This completes the inductive step, as we have demonstrated the correct limit prices, price
and continuation payoff symmetry, and trading functions that are consistent with equilibrium
(for low ∆). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1 on p. 25. Consider all markets of at least 3 agents (n ≥ 3), because the
case with two agents is trivial. The proof proceeds by induction over the number of informed
agents
Base Case: If m = n − 1 then by adapting the base case pricing formula from the proof of
Proposition 1, we get
p(m) =
w[1− δρ(δ,m)(n− 1)]
1− δρ(δ,m)[w(n− 1) + (1− w)]
v ≥ 0
Inductive Step: Given that p(m+ 1) ≥ 0, we now consider the case of p(m).
13Note that the above bounding argument assumed that p(|K|) ≥ 0, which must be true for sufficiently
small ∆, as prices are continuous as a function of ∆.
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The proof proceeds by writing the Nash bargaining pricing equation, stepping the value
functions forward, and rewriting in terms of the next step price p(m+ 1):
p(m) = w(v + δV s(m+ 1)− δV b(m))− (1− w)(δV s(m+ 1)− δV s(m))
= w(v + δV s(m+ 1)
− δρ(δ,m)
[
m[v − p(m)] + δm(n−m− 1)V b(m+ 1) + δmV s(m+ 1)
]
)
− (1− w)(δV s(m+ 1)− δρ(δ,m) [(n−m)p(m) + δm(n−m)V s(m+ 1)])
= w[1− δρ(δ,m)m]v + wδV s(m+ 1) + [wm+ (1− w)(n−m)]δρ(δ,m)p(m)
− δ2wρ(δ,m)m(n−m− 1)V b(m+ 1)− δ2wρ(δ,m)mV s(m+ 1)− (1− w)δV s(m+ 1)
+ (1− w)δ2ρ(δ,m)m(n−m)V s(m+ 1)
= w[1− δρ(δ,m)m]v + [wm+ (1− w)(n−m)]δρ(δ,m)p(m)
+ δ(2w − 1)V s(m+ 1)− δ2ρ(δ,m)m[w(n−m− 1)V b(m+ 1)
+ (w − (1− w)(n−m))V s(m+ 1)]
= w[1− δρ(δ,m)m]v + [wm+ (1− w)(n−m)]δρ(δ,m)p(m)
+ δ(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)[(n−m)p(m+ 1) + δm(n−m)V s(m+ 2)]
− δ2ρ(δ,m)m[w(n−m− 1)V b(m+ 1) + (w − (1− w)(n−m))V s(m+ 1)]
= w[1− δρ(δ,m)m(n −m)]v + [wm+ (1− w)(n−m)]δρ(δ,m)p(m)
+ δ(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)(n−m)p(m+ 1)
− δ2(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)m[V s(m+ 1)− V s(m+ 2)]
+ δρ(δ,m)m(n−m− 1)[w(v + δV s(m+ 2)− δV b(m+ 1))
− (1− w)(δV s(m+ 2)− δV s(m+ 1))]
Thus, p(m) ≥ 0 if the following holds:
δ(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)(n−m)p(m+ 1)− δ2(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)m[V s(m+ 1)− V s(m+ 2)]
+ δρ(δ,m)m(n−m− 1)p(m+ 1) ≥ 0
Recall that w ≥ 1
2
. Using the fact that V s(m+ 1)− V s(m+ 2) ≤ p(m+ 1) and replacing w
with 1 and replacing δ2 with δ:
p(m) ≥ δ(2w − 1)ρ(δ,m)(n−m)p(m+ 1) + δρ(δ,m)m(n −m− 2)p(m+ 1)
The base case had n−m−1 = 0, so it must be that n−m−2 ≥ 0. Thus, p(m) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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